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STUDENT LOAN DISCHARGE: REEVALUATING UNDUE
HARDSHIP UNDER A PRESUMPTION OF
CONSISTENT USAGE
ABSTRACT
An increasing number of Americans are suffering from financial distress
caused by educational debt. Some of those individuals seek relief from that
distress through the bankruptcy system, where they must establish that repaying
their educational debt would impose an undue hardship in order to obtain a
discharge of such debt. The focus of this Comment is § 523(a)(8) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, which sets forth educational debt as an exception to
bankruptcy discharge unless the repayment of student loan obligations imposes
an “undue hardship.” In drafting this section, Congress did not define the term
“undue hardship,” thereby empowering the courts to determine what constitutes
undue hardship and the circumstances that deserve forgiveness of educational
debt. As a result, courts have developed a variety of tests to provide a framework
for determining whether a debt should be dischargeable.
Congress’s decision to condition the relief of educational loans on the
application of a vague and indeterminate standard has proved to be problematic
for various reasons. One solution, not yet discussed by courts and
commentators, is to look to other federal statutes and regulations implementing
the undue hardship standard to evaluate the application of the standard and
consider how those applications can inform the undue hardship analysis in the
bankruptcy context.
By evaluating the undue hardship standard in the context of public benefits,
employment discrimination, financial aid eligibility, tax payment extensions,
and discovery in civil procedure, this Comment supports the conclusion that the
primary inquiry into a debtor’s undue hardship claim must focus on the debtor’s
current financial circumstances without undue regard to pre-bankruptcy
conduct or assurance of persisting financial distress. Any definition Congress
provides to “undue hardship” in § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code should
include factors that evaluate the future livelihood of the debtor if she is denied
bankruptcy relief based on the debtor’s current financial circumstances.
INTRODUCTION
Student loan debt in the United States has been on a continual rise becoming
the second highest consumer debt category with more than forty-four million
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borrowers holding over one and a half trillion dollars in student loan debt.1 This
figure represents more than two and a half times the amount of student loan debt
owed just a decade earlier.2 These are the statistics driving the literature
describing the student loan debt crisis, a crisis driven by rising tuition rates that
exceed student financial aid and family income necessary to cover educational
costs, forcing students to rely on student loans to finance higher education.3
Educational loan borrowers have increasingly found themselves unable to repay
their student loans as indicated by student loan default rates, resulting in negative
effects to an individual’s financial well-being and leading to financial distress.4
While there are many potential solutions to the rising costs of tuition and
resulting dependency on student loans, this Comment views bankruptcy as one
solution to the financial distress that students with burdensome student loans
face because of the policy objectives driving bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law is
a statutory mechanism for individuals and entities burdened by financial
obligations to discharge their debts.5 Two main public policy objectives govern
the purpose behind bankruptcy law. First, bankruptcy provides a mechanism for
creditor repayment through a liquidation process or through a repayment plan.6
Second, debtors receive relief from creditors and obtain a fresh financial start
that is unburdened by the pressure and struggles of onerous pre-existing debts.7
The focus of my Comment is § 523(a)(8) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
which determines a debtor’s ability to discharge student loan debt if the
repayment of student loan obligations imposes an “undue hardship.”8 My
Comment examines the impact of Congress’s decision to delegate the task of
interpreting the undue hardship exception to the judiciary and argues that the
statutory interpretation tool of consistent usage provides a viable means for

1
Zack Friedman, Have Student Loans Caused A Drop In Home Ownership?, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/01/18/student-loans-home-ownership/#28d2596c3d22 (Jan.
18, 2019, 8:32 AM).
2
Anthony Cilluffo, 5 Facts About Student Loans, Pew Research Center (Aug. 24, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/24/5-facts-about-student-loans/.
3
Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, College Costs Rising Faster than Financial Aid, Report Says, WASHINGTON
POST (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/10/26/college-costs-risingfaster-than-financial-aid-report-says/?utm_term=.5904ff3b13a4.
4
Press Release, U.S. Department of Education Releases National Student Loan FY 2014 Cohort Default
Rate (Sept. 27, 2017); see also William Elliott & Melinda Lewis, Student Debt Effects on Financial Well-Being:
Research and Policy Implications, 29 J. ECON. SURVS. 614, 624 (2015).
5
Robert B. Milligan, Putting an End to Judicial Lawmaking: Abolishing the Undue Hardship Exception
for Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 221, 224 (2000).
6
See id. at 225.
7
Id. at 225–26.
8
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018).
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reinterpreting the phrase “undue hardship” to create a consistent and fair
standard to help courts determine whether a student debtor’s circumstance
constitutes undue hardship that necessitates discharge of the educational debt.
My research involves researching relevant federal statutes and regulations to
determine how the phrase “undue hardship” is interpreted and applied to
determine whether that definition and application can inform courts on how the
standard may be used in the context of student loan discharge proceedings to
create consistent treatment of student-loan debtors.
First, this Comment provides background on the evolution of student loan
programs and the bankruptcy system. Next, this Comment provides the legal
doctrine behind tools of statutory construction, including the presumption of
consistent usage, that I use to support the concept of looking across federal laws
to discern common threads among the way undue hardship is interpreted and
applied to help inform the use of the standard in the bankruptcy context. My
Comment then analyzes the various federal provisions using the undue hardship
standard by describing the provisions, analyzing case law decisions interpreting
the standard, and discerning key points that can be used to inform the use of the
standard in determining whether student loans may be discharged in bankruptcy.
Finally, this Comment proposes some important policy considerations that
support the idea that the undue hardship standard in the bankruptcy context
needs to be reevaluated by circuit courts that are continually faced with the
decision of what constitutes an undue hardship to warrant the discharge of
student loan debt.
I.

BACKGROUND

Student loan programs were originally intended as a program of last resort
for college students seeking to finance their education, and only the most needy
students qualified for a loan.9 The purpose surrounding the creation of the first
student loan programs, around the time of Lyndon Johnson’s “war on poverty,”
was to reduce financial barriers and overcome the equalities of opportunity
among potential college enrollees.10 The result was widespread demand for
additional student financial aid, which Congress responded to by enacting the
Middle Income Student Assistance Act, which made federal student loans
available to students with less regard to need.11 Among other expansions of

9
Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV.
501, 504 (2000).
10
Id. at 505.
11
Id.
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student financial aid programs and policy, student borrowing rates increased
drastically. The evolution of student loan programs and the impact that it had on
cost and accessibility of higher education is responsible for creating the so-called
“Indentured Generation” of student borrowers, a nickname that scholars have
given students that will likely be burdened with student loan debt for much of
their lives.12
Around the same time Congress was expanding the student loan program,
Congress also began the process of ending the opportunity to discharge student
loan debt through bankruptcy due to fears of bankruptcy abuse by student
debtors.13 Prior to the current Bankruptcy Code, student loans were not treated
differently from any other dischargeable debt. The practice changed with the
passage of the Education Amendments Act of 1976, which prohibited discharge
of student loans in bankruptcy for the first five years of loan repayment unless
the debtor could establish undue hardship.14 The 1978 Bankruptcy Code
endorsed the five-year bar against discharge of student debt.15 In 1990, the
student loan discharge exception was extended to seven years. 16 Then, in 1998,
the Code was amended so that federally guaranteed student loans could not be
discharged unless the debtor could prove undue hardship.17 With this historical
context in mind, tension continues to exist between federal student aid programs
that encourage students to borrow to access to higher education, and federal
bankruptcy law that characterize educational debts as an exception to the general
rule that discharge forgives pre-bankruptcy debts, unless the educational debts
impose undue hardship.
Under the current provision governing the discharge of educational loans, a
debtor availing herself of the bankruptcy system must establish that repaying her
educational debt would impose an undue hardship in order to obtain a discharge
of such debt.18 An important consideration by a student loan borrower who
wishes to discharge pre-bankruptcy educational debts is what she must show to
make a claim of undue hardship. The relevant provision, however, does not
provide a definition or standard to explain what constitutes an “undue hardship”
that warrants discharge of educational loans.19 The legislative history of the
12
Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 329, 330–31 (2013).
13
Roots, supra note 9, at 512.
14
Austin, supra note 12, at 363.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 363–64.
17
Id. at 364.
18
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
19
Id. § 523(a)(8).
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section also fails to precisely specify how courts should determine whether a
debtor qualifies for a discharge based on an undue hardship.20 The task of
interpreting undue hardship and establishing the conditions that warrant the
discharge of educational loans has consequently fallen to the federal judiciary.
As a result, courts have developed a variety of tests to provide a framework for
determining whether an individual’s educational debt may be discharged.21
Amidst these varying tests, courts have disagreed regarding the threshold for
when an education loan obligation is an undue hardship and what exactly what
a debtor must prove in order to discharge a student loan on undue hardship
grounds.22
The vast majority of courts, including nine of the country’s thirteen federal
circuit courts, have interpreted “undue hardship” to require the debtor to prove
three things:
(1) the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses,
a “minimal” standard of living for himself and his dependents if forced
to repay the loans; (2) additional circumstances exist indicating that
the debtor’s inability to pay is likely to persist for a significant portion
of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) the debtor has
made good faith efforts to repay the loans.23

The debtor must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of the
evidence.24 This standard is commonly referred to as the “Brunner test” after the
case in which the standard first originated. The Brunner test is considered highly
fact-intensive, and not all courts apply the standard the same way.25 For

20
Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical
Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 487, 419–28 (2005).
21
See Johnson v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Johnson), 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11428 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979), Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Services Corp. (In re Brunner), 46
B.R. 752 (1985), Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987), Simons v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Simons), 119 B.R. 589, 592–93 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1990) (taking a totality-of-the-circumstances-approach); see also Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans,
Bankruptcy and the Fresh Start Policy: Must Debtors be Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans?, 71
TUL. L. REV. 139, 149 (1996) (stating there are as many tests for undue hardship as there are bankruptcy courts).
22
Kevin Lewis, Bankruptcy and Student Loans, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 1 (Feb.
22, 2018).
23
Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d at 396.
24
Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 358–59 (6th Cir. 2007); Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007).
25
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Buchanan, 276 B.R. 744, 752 (N.D. W. Va. 2002); see Hicks v. Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 30 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (arguing that even though “both the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits” have purportedly “adopted identical versions of the Brunner test,” “the Brunner
test as adopted by the Eleventh Circuit does not include the same considerations as the Brunner test adopted by
the Tenth Circuit”).
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example, many courts find that hardship must go beyond the ordinary hardship
of a debtor in bankruptcy.26 Many courts focus on the predicted length of the
hardship.27 Others have held that hardship must be truly severe and prolonged
to warrant discharge.28 There are courts, however, that view the requisite
hardship in a less demanding sense. Two have recently concluded that the
hardship inquiry is whether the debtor has adequate resources to repay the loan
and maintain a minimum standard of living.29 What results from the Brunner
test, and many others used to determine what constitutes an “undue hardship,”
is variance in the extent of the hardship required to obtain relief.
Congress’s decision to condition educational loan relief on the application
of a vague and indeterminate standard has proven to be problematic for many
reasons. It is recognized that there is “a troubling disconnect between the
26
Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 245 B.R. 731, 743 (2000) (citing United Student Aid Funds v. Pena (In
re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998)) (“garden variety” hardship not enough); Law v. Educ. Res. Inst.
(In re Law), 159 B.R. 287, 291 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993) (“Despite its discretionary nature, the interpretation [of
undue hardship under a totality of the circumstances approach] does, nonetheless, contemplate the existence of
unique and extraordinary circumstances, for the fact that repayment would merely impose a hardship is
insufficient”); Ford v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Ford), 151 B.R. 135, 138–40 (M.D. Tenn. 1993)
(“describing standards of hardship that go beyond “mere financial hardship or present financial adversity”); In
re Lohman, 79 B.R. 576, 584 (D. Vt. 1987) (debtor’s circumstances must be “exceptional and extreme”).
27
Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 245 B.R. at 743 (citing Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp.,
831 F.2d 395, 396 (“Requiring evidence not only of current inability to pay but also of additional, exceptional
circumstances, strongly suggestive of continuing inability to repay over an extended period of time, more reliably
guarantees that the hardship presented is ‘undue.’”); accord Barrows v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm’n (In re
Bush Barrows), 182 B.R. 640, 648 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994); see also Dresser v. Univ. of Me. (In re Dresser), 33
B.R. 63, 65 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) (debtor must demonstrate that for the foreseeable future it would be impossible
for him to generate enough income to “pay off” the loan and maintain his household “above the poverty level”).
28
Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 245 B.R. at 743 (citing Wetzel v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs.
Corp. (In re Wetzel), 213 B.R. 220, 225 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (“There must be an extraordinary situation
with a certainty of hopelessness as to any possibility of repayment for the indefinite future. Mere inconvenience,
austere budget, financial difficulty and inadequate present employment are not grounds for discharging
educational debts [for undue hardship]”); In re Mathews, 166 B.R. at 943, 945 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994) (by using
“undue” as a modifier, Congress “meant that ordinary ‘garden variety’ hardship would not suffice,” the debtor
“must show that the combination of the low income and exceptional circumstances is so severe and oppressive
that there is no way that the debtor will ever be able to repay the debt and maintain a minimal standard of living”);
In re Rappaport, 16 B.R. 615, 617 (Bankr. D.N.J.) (requiring “total incapacity now and in the future to pay one’s
debts for reasons not within the control of the individual debtor”). See also Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency
v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305–06 (3rd Cir. 1995) (debtor entitled to live in something more than “abject
poverty,” must show “she could not maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay her loans” which is
a showing of something more than “tight finances”)).
29
Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 245 B.R. at 744 (citing Peel v. Salliemae Servicing-Heal Loan (In re
Peel), 240 B.R. 387, 394–95 (1999)); Salinas v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Salinas), 240 B.R. 305,
313 (lamenting that too many courts “discuss ‘undue hardship’ in the most stringent of terms, focusing not upon
whether the debtor possesses an ‘adequate’ income but rather whether the debtor is scraping by on a ‘minimal’
standard of living); see also Doherty v. United States Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Doherty), 219 B.R. 665, 671 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1998) (arguing that In re Brunner does not require a “certainty of hopelessness” standard, basing its
finding on “the most probable near-future for a debtor”).
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original purpose of the student-loan program to democratize American higher
education and the fiscal policies that are necessary to ensure program solvency
and protect borrowers from enslaving debt and inevitable default.”30 The undue
hardship standard in the exceptions to discharge provision of the Bankruptcy
Code has also been deemed “unworkable” because of how inconsistent results
are when judges apply the exception.31 Inconsistent judicial determinations of
undue hardship are problematic because of the way they undermine the
uniformity and efficiency of bankruptcy law.32 Accordingly, there is a pressing
need for a reevaluation of the standard courts use to determine the
dischargeability of student loans in bankruptcy.
Two issues tend to arise in the debate over providing debt forgiveness relief
in general to individuals: (1) the ability of a debtor to repay her pre-bankruptcy
debts due to the concern that bankruptcy should be limited from those with a
means to repay and (2) the causes of the debtor’s financial situation that resulted
in the debtor filing for bankruptcy due to concern that the debtor’s situation
stems from irresponsible conduct instead of true misfortune.33 Scholarly
research and case law provide evidence that courts have focused on the latter
issue in conducting their undue hardship determinations, which has resulted in a
focus on the cause of the financial hardship instead of the effect that declaring
the debt nondischargeable would have on the debtor.34 This Comment adopts the
argument advanced by Professor Rafael Pardo and Professor Michelle Lacey
that the undue hardship inquiry in the bankruptcy context should be confined to
an inquiry into a debtor’s ability to repay educational debt without reference to
the debtor’s prebankruptcy conduct, as such consideration of such conduct is
unnecessary to the discharge analysis.35 This Comment expands on this
argument by looking to other federal law implementing the undue hardship
standard to discern a more coherent approach to interpreting and applying undue
hardship for purposes of determining whether educational debt ought to be
deemed dischargeable in bankruptcy. The phrase “undue hardship” does not
represent a complete gray area in the law without any guideposts about how to
rule. Determining the proper statutory construction of the phrase “undue
hardship” is a necessary step in determining the meaning of undue hardship that
30
Robert C. Cloud & Richard Fossey, Facing the Student Debt Crisis: Restoring the Integrity of the
Federal Student Loan Program, 40 J. C. & U. L. 467, 496 (2014).
31
Milligan, supra note 5, at 254.
32
Id. at 258 n. 244 (2000) (citing NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS: FINAL
REPORT, 1.4.5, chapter 5 (1997) (stating that bankruptcy law should treat debtors uniformly)).
33
Pardo & Lacey, supra note 20, at 510.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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reflects congressional intent and continuity in the law of the undue hardship
standard that courts should recognize and use in the discharge of student loan
debt.36
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION DOCTRINE
“Undue hardship” is a widely used and accepted phrase in a variety of federal
laws. Determining the proper statutory meaning of the phrase “undue hardship”
as used in the Bankruptcy Code can be aided by the use of various tools and
methods of statutory interpretation to analyze and synthesize the various other
federal provisions using the phrase “undue hardship.” Both judges and scholars
have developed an arsenal of interpretative techniques designed to extract the
functional meaning from ambiguous statutory text and conflicting legislative
history. By using these interpretative techniques, judges faced with the challenge
of construing legislative text and history can render consistent interpretations.37
Statutory interpretation begins with an unclear or ambiguous term or phrase
as determined by statutory construction.38 It is a well known rule that courts
cannot interpret a statute that is clear and unambiguous.39 Ambiguity arises when
“a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons
in two or more different senses.”40 Once deemed ambiguous, formal legal
analysis views ambiguity as an opportunity to problem solve rather than an
opportunity to exploit.41 When encountering ambiguity, a cardinal rule of
construction is that the “whole statute should be drawn upon as necessary, with
its various parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context in a
manner that furthers statutory purpose.”42 This rule was articulated by Justice
Scalia in United Savings Association v. Timbers:

36
See generally Brief of Amici Curiae National Consumer Law Center And National Association Of
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Murphy v. U.S. Dept. of Education, No. 14-1691 (1st Cir. Oct. 25, 2016).
37
Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value Of
Ambiguity In Statutory Design And Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002).
38
Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“We begin with
the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the
statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive.”); Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“In interpreting a statute
a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others. . . . Courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”).
39
Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. at 254 (“when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”).
40
In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2002).
41
Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 37, at 642.
42
Larry Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, Congressional Research
Service, at 4 (2011); see also United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
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Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in
a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible
with the rest of the law.43

When a statute is deemed ambiguous and interpretation of the statute is
necessary beyond any finding of a “plain or ordinary meaning,” the intent of the
legislature must be examined and consulted, and the statute must be construed
accordingly. Legislative history can provide guidance for determining the
legislature’s intent and therefore the meaning of ambiguous language in a
statute.44 The idea of focusing on the meaning that the legislature intended to
give the statute is often referred to as intentionalism and is touted as “facilitating
healthy interbranch relations” by promoting commonality between the
legislature and the judiciary.45 Legislative history, however, is not always
conclusive.
In the event that history lacks indication of Congress’s intended
interpretation of an ambiguous term, there are a series of canons of interpretation
that can be used throughout the process to help justify and provide support for a
particular interpretation of a statute.46 These statutory interpretation tools serve
as “rules of thumb or presumptions” that help uncover substantive meaning
from, for example, the language, context, structure, and subject matter of a
statute.47 While Black’s Law Dictionary does not treat canons as common law,
stating that canons are treated “as mere as customs not having the force of law,”
these customs have had a substantial influence in ascertaining what the drafters
of a statute meant.48
Canons important to this Comment include the “whole act rule” which
provides that the entirety of a document (in this case, the Bankruptcy Code)
provides context for each of its parts. Therefore, this canon establishes that when
construing a statute, the text of the entire statute as a whole must be considered,
(1988); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing how
courts also may look to the broader body of law into which the enactment fits).
43
United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
44
A Guide To Reading, Interpreting And Applying Statutes, WRITING CTR. AT GEO. U.L. CTR., at 9,
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-center/
upload/A-Guide-to-Reading-Interpreting-and-Applying-Statutes.pdf.
45
Id.
46
See generally id.
47
Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 344 (2010).
48
Id. at 345.
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which is important when the ambiguous term or phrase one is trying to
understand is also used elsewhere in the statute.49 Another important canon
includes the presumption of consistent usage, which presumes that a word or
phrase has the same meaning throughout a text. This canon is also referred to as
in pari materia and allows a court to assume that when two statutes use the same
vocabulary to discuss the same or similar subject matter, the legislature intended
the terms to have the same meaning.50 These canons operate on the presumption
that legislative bodies use the same term consistently. Additionally, the relatedstatutes canon purports that statutes dealing with the same subject are to be
interpreted together, as though they were on law.51 In certain areas,
interpretations are recognized to cut across statutes. Another similar canon of
construction, the common law of extrinsic sources, permits interpreters to look
for meaning beyond a code’s text.52 This canon embraces the idea of “continuity
in law” and looking to sources outside the statute at issue to help discern
meaning or intent.53 With this brief foundation, I will now turn to an analysis of
the phrase “undue hardship” as used across the federal code using the principles
and canons discussed in this section to clarify the meaning of 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8) for determining whether a debtor’s economic status meets a
threshold that supports a discharge of burdensome student loan debt.
III. UNDUE HARDSHIP ANALYSIS
The undue hardship standard as interpreted by a majority of the circuit courts
includes, in part, an inquiry into whether a debtor will maintain a future inability
to repay the student loan and has made good faith efforts to repay the loan in
order to receive a discharge of student loan debt.54 Judges tend to measure a
debtor’s good faith by her “efforts to obtain employment, maximize income, and
minimize expenses.”55 Additionally, some courts consider whether the debtor
has participated in alternative loan repayment options.56 Regardless, all of these
measurements of good faith effort focus on the debtor’s prebankruptcy conduct,
which essentially leads to an inquiry into why the debtor is in financial distress

49

See Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 200 (3rd Cir. 1998).
Scott, supra note 47, at 376.
51
See Larry Eig, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, General Principles and Recent Trends 15 (2014).
52
Larry Eig, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, General Principles and Recent Trends (2011).
53
Id.
54
Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2nd Cir. 1987); Roe v. Law
Unit (In re Roe), 226 B.R. 258, 274 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (finding that the debtor did not establish sufficient good
faith in claiming undue hardship under the Johnson test).
55
Austin, supra note 12, at 379.
56
Id.
50
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and how their prebankruptcy conduct contributed to their current financial state.
Congress, however, has clearly indicated elsewhere in the federal code that it
knows how to incorporate good faith, or an inquiry into an individual’s conduct,
as a condition that is separate and distinct from the condition of undue hardship
for purposes of determining whether an undue hardship exists.57 Accordingly,
the interpretation of undue hardship used by a majority of the circuit courts in
bankruptcy proceedings means that courts interpret the phrase “undue hardship”
differently for purposes of evaluating the dischargeability of educational loans
compared to how the standard is used and analyzed throughout other provisions
of the U.S. Code. This interpretation is a direct contradiction to the wellestablished canon of the presumption of consistent usage, which suggests that a
word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text.58 My
analysis will now look to the other uses of the undue hardship standard in the
Bankruptcy Code and the U.S. Code to establish that an undue hardship inquiry
should focus on the effect that the claimed hardship is having on the individual
based on the individual’s current circumstances and the implications for an
individual if their claim for relief based on the undue hardship is rejected.
A. Reaffirmation Agreements in the Bankruptcy Code
In the Bankruptcy Code, the use of the undue hardship standard in the
reaffirmation agreement provision suggests that the undue hardship analysis
should primarily focus on the current financial circumstances of a debtor. As
acknowledged by scholars, the reaffirmation agreement provision is the only
other place undue hardship appears in the Bankruptcy Code besides in the
educational loan context.59 Under 11 U.S.C. § 524, the provision governing
reaffirmation agreements, an agreement that makes the debtor legally bound to
repay a debt that would otherwise be discharged is enforceable only if a variety
of requirements meant to safeguard the debtor’s fresh start are all satisfied.60
Among these requirements includes language that the agreement must “not
impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.”61 The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)

57
Brief for Professor Rafael Pardo as Amicus Curiae, p., Murphy v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No. 14-1691
(1st Cir. Oct. 25, 2016).
58
See A Guide To Reading, Interpreting And Applying Statutes, supra note 44; Scott, supra note 47, at
376.
59
See Brief for Professor Rafael Pardo as Amicus Curiae, p. 11–13, Murphy v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No.
14-1691 (1st Cir. Oct. 25, 2016).
60
11 U.S.C. § 524(m)(1).
61
Id.
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clarified the “undue hardship” standard in the reaffirmation agreement context
by providing that a presumption of undue hardship arises in the reaffirmation
context if the debtor’s disposable income, measured by income level minus
expenses, is not enough to make the payments as required in the reaffirmation
agreement.62 If the presumption arises, it can be rebutted only if the debtor is
able to identify additional funding that will allow him or her to make the
scheduled payments per the agreement.63 Accordingly, the provision focuses on
the debtor’s ability to repay a debt determined by the debtor’s disposable
income, which ultimately measures the effect that the reaffirmation agreement
would have on the future livelihood of the debtor.
While the Bankruptcy Code itself sheds some light on what the undue
hardship standard means, it is worth looking beyond it to other provisions of
federal code that apply the undue hardship standard to discern a more coherent
approach to interpreting and applying the standard for purposes of § 523(a)(8)
in the Bankruptcy Code. By analyzing the undue hardship standard in the context
of public safety benefits, employment discrimination, student financial aid
eligibility, tax payment extensions, social security benefits, and discovery in
civil litigation, common threads exist that suggest that an evaluation of good
faith or conduct in general in an undue hardship analysis is misguided. In fact,
other federal law provides strong support for the conclusion that Congress
intended undue hardship to focus on the impact or affect an alleged hardship is
having on an individual rather than evaluating the cause of the hardship, whether
an individual has made a good faith effort to avoid their hardship, and whether
the hardship will persist.
B. Public Safety Officer Death Benefits
When it comes to considering an individual’s conduct for purposes of
granting relief, Congress has clearly indicated in federal law that it knows how
to expressly incorporate good faith as a condition that is separate and distinct
from the condition of undue hardship for purposes of granting relief.64 A prime
example of this is found in the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act, which
established a program to provide death benefits or disability benefits to certain
public safety officers whose death or disability occurred in the line of duty.65
The provision, 34 U.S.C. § 10281(m), which contains the phrase undue
62

Id.
Id.
64
See Brief for Professor Rafael Pardo as Amicus Curiae, p. 11–13, Murphy v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No.
14-1691 (1st Cir. Oct. 25, 2016).
65
34 U.S.C. § 10281(m).
63
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hardship, concerns collection actions of benefits that are disbursed pursuant to a
statute enacted retroactively or in error, and reads in whole as follows: “The
Bureau may suspend or end collection action on an amount disbursed pursuant
to a statute enacted retroactively or otherwise disbursed in error under subsection
(a) or (c) of this section, where such collection would be impractical, or would
cause undue hardship to a debtor who acted in good faith.”66 In other words, an
undue hardship serves as a defense against collection actions for benefits
disbursed in error or benefits disbursed under a statute enacted retroactively.
Undue hardship in this context has not been interpreted in case law,
regulations, or guidance policy, but is worth noting due to the construction of
the statute. The fact that Congress placed “undue hardship” in conjunction with
the clause “acted in good faith” in the same provision suggests that when
Congress uses on the term “undue hardship,” it should not include a good faith
requirement. This conclusion is supported by the rule against surplusage, which
is a presumption that the legislature put every word in the statute for a reason.
The rule against surplusage is regarded as “a cardinal principle of statutory
construction” and stands for the proposition that “a statue ought, upon the whole,
to be construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant.”67 In other words, a statute should not be
interpreted in a way that renders a word or phrase superfluous when such an
interpretation can be avoided.68 If the undue hardship standard were to include
an inquiry into good faith, the latter half of § 10281(m) using the clause “acted
in good faith” would be insignificant, if not wholly superfluous, since the undue
hardship analysis would already include an inquiry into the good faith of the
debtor. The Supreme Court has made clear, it is “reluctant to treat statutory terms
as surplusage” in any setting.”69 This example of statutory construction that
makes an express distinction between undue hardship and good faith provides
strong support for the conclusion that a definition for undue hardship in the
bankruptcy context should not include factors that evaluate good faith efforts or
debtor’s pre-bankruptcy conduct.

66

Id.
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).
68
United States v. e-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82, 93 (D.D.C. 2008).
69
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. at 174; see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore.,
515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994) (“judges should hesitate
to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting).
67
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C. Employment Discrimination
The application of the undue hardship standard as a defense for an employer
who cannot make accommodations for an employee also supports the conclusion
that an undue hardship analysis should focus on an individual’s current
circumstances. An analysis of how the undue hardship standard is interpreted
and applied in the employment discrimination context shows that an undue
hardship analysis is distinct from an analysis evaluating good faith or persisting
financial hardship. Out of all the provisions undue hardship is used in federal
law, both Congress and the Supreme Court have been most generous in shedding
some light on what the undue hardship standard means in the context of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The undue hardship standard is
included in the ADA as a defense against accommodating an employee’s
disability.70 Specifically, the statute provides that discriminating:
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability includes not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who
is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business of such covered entity.71

The regulation implementing the law further clarifies the undue hardship
standard as used in this employment context by providing a definition to undue
hardship. According to 29 CFR 1630.2, “undue hardship means, with respect to
the provision of an accommodation, significant difficulty or expense incurred by
a covered entity, when considered in light of the factors set forth in . . . this
section.”72
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, a summary of the factors laid out in the regulation
include the nature and net cost of the accommodation, overall financial resources
of the facility and effect on expenses and resources, the overall financial
resources of the covered entity, the type of operations of the covered entity, and
the impact on the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including
the impact on the facility’s ability to conduct business.73 The U.S. Equal
70
See Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L. R. 1, 2–3 (1990).
71
42 U.S.C § 12112.
72
29 CRF 1630.2.
73
Id. (“In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity,
factors to be considered include: (i) The nature and net cost of the accommodation needed under this part, taking
into consideration the availability of tax credits and deductions, and/or outside funding; (ii) The overall financial
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Employment Opportunity Commission has issued guidance that sheds further
light on the standard, defining “undue hardship” to mean “significant difficulty
or expense” and directs an undue hardship inquiry focus on the resources and
circumstances of the particular employer in relationship to the cost or difficulty
of providing a specific accommodation.74
Since the undue hardship is used as a defense to accommodating an
employee’s disability, an employer must carry the burden of proof in showing a
court that making a requested reasonable accommodation poses an undue
hardship.75 The court’s inquiry into whether the defense is allowable follows this
systematic analysis: If the employee establishes that a reasonable
accommodation is possible, then the employer must prove that the
accommodation is unreasonable and imposes an “undue hardship” on the
employer.76 It is the first part of this analysis, the establishment of a “reasonable
accommodation,” that sheds an important light on what the “undue hardship”
analysis entails. Referred to as the “interactive process,” the process of deciding
whether an accommodation is reasonable includes determining: (1) whether an
individual let his or her employer know that she needs an adjustment or change
at work for a reason related to a medical condition, and (2) whether the employer
demonstrated reasonable efforts to assist and communicate with the employee
in good faith regarding the employee’s needs and request.77 A significant piece
in this “interactive process” includes an evaluation and determination of
employer’s conduct and whether the employer made a good faith effort to

resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation, the number of
persons employed at such facility, and the effect on expenses and resources; (iii) The overall financial resources
of the covered entity, the overall size of the business of the covered entity with respect to the number of its
employees, and the number, type and location of its facilities; (iv) The type of operation or operations of the
covered entity, including the composition, structure and functions of the workforce of such entity, and the
geographic separateness and administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the
covered entity; and (v) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the impact
on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility’s ability to conduct
business.”).
74
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Number 915.002 (Oct. 17,
2002).
75
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002); see also The U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission: EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Number 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002).
76
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
77
Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (Oct. 17, 2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#requesting; see
also Tiffani L. McDonough, Implementing the Interactive Process under the ADA, ABA (Oct. 16, 2013),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/employment/articles/fall2013-1013-implementinginteractive-process-under-ada.html.
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accommodate the employee’s needs.78 While the interactive process is not
expressly spelled out in statute, courts recognize that the obligation of an
employer to engage in an interactive process with an employee is inherent in the
statutory obligation to offer a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise
qualified disabled employee.79 Accordingly, since an evaluation of an
employer’s good faith effort to make an accommodation occurs during the
reasonable accommodation inquiry, no evaluation of the employer’s conduct
occurs in the undue hardship determination. Instead, the undue hardship analysis
focuses on discerning whether the accommodation discussed in the interactive
process causes the employer “significant difficulty or expense” in light of the
factors found in the regulation.80
The Supreme Court clarified and affirmed that there is a distinction in the
analysis between a reasonable accommodation effort, which requires a good
faith effort on the part of an employer to make an accommodation, and the undue
hardship inquiry, which an employer can use as a defense to making such an
accommodation, in US Airways v. Barnett.81 In Barnett, the Court considered
whether the ADA required an employer to allow an employee with a disability
to be employed in a position as a reasonable accommodation when another
employee was entitled to that position under the employer’s seniority system.82
U.S. Airways argued that an accommodation that required an exception to a
seniority system always showed that the accommodation was not reasonable.83
On the other hand, Barnett argued that an exception to a seniority system never
showed that an accommodation was not reasonable, but it could help show that
the accommodation would cause undue employer hardship, which the employer
would have to show.84 The Court debated the merits of each argument and
determined that the decision depended on how the phrase reasonable
accommodation was reconciled with the phrase undue hardship. In the holding,
the Court determined that first an employee needed to show the accommodation

78
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary
for [the employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with [the employee] in need of the accommodation.
This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”); see also Marcia L. DePaula, ADA: Are You
Participating In The Interactive Process In “Good Faith”?, STEPTONE & JOHNSON PLLC (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://www.steptoe-johnson.com/content/ada-are-you-participating-interactive-process-good-faith.
79
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1127 (10th Cir. 1999).
80
See 29 CRF 1630.2.
81
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (finding that employee did not present evidence of
special circumstances demonstrating reasonableness).
82
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 393–94.
83
Id. at 396.
84
Id.
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seemed “reasonable on its face.”85 After that, the employer must show special
circumstances in light of the employee’s circumstances that indicate the
existence of an undue hardship.86 Justice O’Connor concurred with the
distinction between the two inquires, stating that “these interpretations give
appropriate meaning to both the term “reasonableness” and “undue hardship”
preventing the concepts from overlapping by making reasonableness a general
inquiry and undue hardship a specific inquiry.”87
Since this decision, case law has continued to illustrate the difference
between a reasonable accommodation effort and undue hardship analysis. For
example, in Ace v. Armstrong Utilities, the court denied an employer’s motion
for summary judgment on a failure to accommodate a claim under the ADA.88
In discussing the issue of the case, the court made clear that the issue was
whether the employer made a good-faith effort to accommodate to the employee
and expressly rejected any disputes about undue hardship given the finding that
the employee’s request to work in a cubicle to accommodate his mental
condition would not have imposed an undue hardship on the employer.89 The
way the court distinguished these two issues in the case supports the conclusion
that an evaluation into an individual’s good faith efforts or conduct is a condition
that is separate and distinct from the condition of undue hardship.
Another case example, Yinger v. Postal Presort, involved a former employee
who had a heart condition that required a pacemaker who was terminated after
taking leave for a procedure to replace the pacemaker’s battery.90 The employee
established that he had an ADA qualified disability because his heart condition
interfered with his ability to lift, stand, and walk distances.91 The court found
that the employee had a conversation with his employer that constituted an
adequate request for reasonable accommodations given his heart problems.92
The court affirmed that the conversation, referred to as the interactive process,
involved an obligation by both parties to proceed in an interactive manner and
engage in good faith communications to identify a reasonable accommodation.93
Upon evaluating the conduct and good faith efforts of the employer, the court
found that the employer failed to participate in an interactive process to
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at 401–02.
Id. at 401–02.
Id. at 410–11 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Ace v. Armstrong Utils., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23168, at *1 (W.D. Pa., Feb. 25, 2016).
Id. at *82–83.
Yinger v. Postal Presort, Inc., 693 Fed. Appx. 768, 770–71 (10th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 772.
Id. at 773.
Id.
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determine reasonable accommodations after an employee had made his
accommodation request.94 The court then went on to evaluate the employer’s
undue hardship claim, which it ultimately rejected due to inconsistent and
contradictory explanations for why the employee was no longer employed at the
company.95 The fact that the court reviewed the employee’s reasonable
accommodation claim and the employer’s undue hardship claim separately
further supports the conclusion individual’s good faith efforts or conduct is a
condition that is separate and distinct from the condition of undue hardship.
Instead, as described by the statute, evaluating whether an undue hardship exists
means focusing on the current nature and resources of the employer and
determining whether imposing a duty to make the accommodation will result in
significant difficulty or expense.
A similar use of the phrase undue hardship is used in the Civil Rights Act as
a defense for employers regarding the accommodation of an employee’s
religious practices. The Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination
based on religion, and the statute defines religion as including “all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer’s business.”96 The regulation implementing the
law sheds light on the undue hardship standard as used in this context by
providing two examples of undue hardship, including cost and a disruption to
seniority rights.97
When it comes to cost as an undue hardship, 29 CFR 1605.2 provides that
“an employer may assert undue hardship to justify a refusal to accommodate an
employee’s need to be absent from his or her scheduled duty hours if the
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would require ‘more than a
de minimis cost.’”98 The regulation goes on to specify that “the analysis of what
constitutes ‘more than a de minimis cost’ weighs the identifiable cost in relation
to the size and operating cost of the employer, and the number of individuals

94
Id. at 773–74 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding that “rather than engaging an interactive process with Yinger,
the employer appears to have done just the opposite, expressly telling Postal Presort’s human resources
professional to stay silent and communicate nothing to Yinger regarding his leave request”) (citing Midland
Brake, 180 F.3d 1154, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 916 (10th
Cir. 2004) (employer’s failure to participate in interactive process supported failure-to-accommodate claim).
95
Yinger v. Postal Presort, Inc., 693 Fed. Appx. at 774.
96
42 U.SC.S. § 2000e(j).
97
16 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e).
98
Id. (emphasis added).
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who will in fact need a particular accommodation.”99 While this is admittedly a
very different standard than the definition used by the ADA, an important
similarity exists: the analysis makes a distinction between a reasonable
accommodation effort, which requires a good faith effort on the part of an
employer to make an accommodation, and the undue hardship inquiry, which an
employer can use as a defense to making said accommodation.
Once an individual provides an employer with notice of the need to
accommodate a particular religious practice or belief, both the employer and the
individual have an obligation to engage in an interactive process to determine
whether an accommodation is possible.100 Similar to the interactive process in
the ADA context, the individual has an obligation to identify those employment
practices or rules that interfere with his or her religious belief so that the
employer can assess whether an accommodation is available. The “employer
then has the obligation to consider, in good faith, whether an accommodation is
possible and whether such accommodation poses an undue hardship to its
business operations.”101
The Supreme Court has provided some clarity to the undue hardship standard
in the context of employment discrimination in Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, a case that involved an employee who requested Sundays off from
work for religious purposes, thus overriding the seniority system the airline had
for determining work schedules.102 The employee suggested multiple
accommodations in light of his observance of the Sabbath, but the options were
rejected by Trans World Airlines.103 No accommodation was reached and the
employee was eventually fired for failing to report to work during his assigned
shift.104 The Court affirmed the district court finding that Trans World Airlines
took appropriate action to try accommodate the employee by holding several
meetings in an attempt to find a solution.105
The next part of the Court’s analysis, however, focused on the effect that
honoring the accommodations as discussed in the meeting would have on the
company, including the undue hardship the company would face in light of the
99

Id. (emphasis added).
See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
101
Peter T. Shapiro, Examining the Duty to Provide Religious Accommodations, LEXIS PRACTICE
ADVISOR J. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/posts/
examining-the-duty-to-provide-religious-accommodations.
102
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 64–65 (1977).
103
See id. at 65.
104
See id.
105
See id. at 77.
100
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accommodations that were discussed in the meetings. In other words, the court
was engaging in the undue hardship inquiry separate from its evaluation of the
interactive process and Trans World Airline’s conduct and good faith efforts to
find an accommodation to suit the employee’s needs. In its undue hardship
analysis, the Supreme Court found where the employer would have incurred a
cost of $150.00 in premium wages for a period of three months to arrange
substitutes for the employee who could not work because of his religion, a
showing of undue hardship was met, and accordingly, no accommodation was
required.106 It was also in this case that the Supreme Court spelled out the
threshold of an undue hardship, holding that an “undue hardship” must require
an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating the religious
needs of an employee.107 Under this approach, any accommodation that requires
the employer to incur more than a slight cost would likely constitute
an undue hardship based on the current nature and resources of the business and
relieve the employer from making the accommodation.
Case law has continued to illustrate the difference between a reasonable
accommodation effort and undue hardship analysis in the context of religious
accommodation in the employment context. In another example, Thomas v.
National Association of Letter Carriers, plaintiff was a postal employee whose
religion required a day of rest on its Sabbath. However, plaintiff worked in a
position in which he did not have Saturdays fixed as a day off and likely could
not get the day off due to the seniority system.108 Plaintiff was disciplined for
failing to show up to work when he was scheduled on Saturdays and eventually
was terminated.109 Plaintiff sued alleging that defendant had violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against him based on religion. The
court affirmed the appropriate analysis by explaining that once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate
that an accommodation would cause undue hardship to the employer, supporting
the conclusion that the reasonable accommodations inquiry and undue hardship
inquiries are distinct.110 After finding that plaintiff did make a prima facie case,
the court engaged in an evaluation of the employee’s requested
accommodations, all of which the court found would have violated the post
office’s shift schedule as governed by the union.111 The then court held that the
post office’s actions constitute all that is reasonably required of an employer to
106
107
108
109
110
111

432 U.S. at 84.
Id.
Thomas v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1153–54.
See id. at 1155–56.
See id. at 1156.
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accommodate the employee’s religion, citing the shift schedule violation as an
undue hardship to the business.112 As such, the post office met its burden.
In the event that an employer engages with an employee in good faith effort
regarding an accommodation, but the employee rejects the reasonable
accommodation, the undue hardship analysis becomes irrelevant, further
demonstrating the distinct nature between an evaluation of good faith conduct
and undue hardship. In Cosme v. Henderson, a plaintiff, also a postal office
worker, accepted an employment position knowing that he would not have
Saturdays fixed as a day off even though his religion required a day of rest on
Saturdays, its Sabbath.113 In focusing on the reasonable accommodation portion
of the analysis, the court elaborated that a reasonable accommodation of an
employee’s religion is one that “eliminates the conflict between employment
requirements and religious practices.”114 The court went on to say that process
of finding a reasonable accommodation is intended to be an interactive process
in which both the employer and employee participate.115 If the employer shows
that it made a good faith effort to accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs,
it has satisfied its obligations under Title VII, and the statutory inquiry ends.116
Here, the post office had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
it made good faith efforts to provide a reasonable accommodate for the
employee.117 As a result, the court found the employer’s argument about undue
hardship irrelevant since there is no obligation for an employer to show undue
hardship when the employer has offered other reasonable accommodations but
it was the employee who rejected the reasonable accommodation.118
Evaluating how undue hardship is applied in the employment context is
valuable for understanding what an undue hardship analysis entails and how it
is distinct from any good faith inquiry as suggested by the Supreme Court. The
undue hardship analysis in this context contains factors intended to discern an
employer’s ability to make accommodations based on existing resources and
nature of the business. While the thresholds for what ultimately constitutes an
undue hardship vary from the ADA to the Civil Rights Act, the important point
is that undue hardship analysis focuses on current circumstances and evaluates

112

See id.
Thomas v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149.
114
Cosme v. Henderson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16210 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000) (citing Ansonia Bd. of
Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986)).
115
Id. at *2.
116
Id. at *15.
117
Id. at *16.
118
Cosme v. Henderson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16210.
113
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the impact to an employer if they are required to make the requested
accommodation.
D. Eligibility for Title IV Federal Student Aid
Moving beyond the enlightening use of undue hardship in the ADA and Civil
Rights Act context, it is notable that the undue hardship standard is used in the
Higher Education Act of 1965 in eligibility requirements for Title IV federal
student aid. Here, Congress uses the undue hardship standard as a student
defense for failing to make Satisfactory Academic Progress for eligibility
purposes for Title IV federal student aid.119 If a student can show that an undue
hardship has caused them to fail to achieve Satisfactory Academic Progress, they
can continue to receive their financial aid. According to 20 U.S.C. § 1091(c)(3),
“any institution of higher education at which the student is in attendance may
waive the provisions of paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of this subsection for
undue hardship based on the death of a relative of the student, the personal injury
or illness of the student, or special circumstances as determined by the
institution.” The analysis as to whether a student can make an appeal asserting
undue hardship in order to remain eligible for federal student aid begins with an
inquiry of whether the student is making Satisfactory Academic Progress. With
federal guidance, institutions are allowed to establish reasonable standards for
measuring whether a student is making Satisfactory Academic Progress, and it
is within these standards where student conduct and performance is evaluated as
it relates to the student’s academic progress.120 For example, University of
Virginia School of Law’s Satisfactory Academic Progress Policy lays out
quantitative and qualitative factors to measure student performance, such as
maximum time frame to complete a course of study, credit hour completion rate,
and cumulative grade point average.121 Trinity Washington University explains
that the relationship between Satisfactory Academic Progress and Financial Aid
is about objective numbers, meaning the student’s cumulative GPA or credit
completion rate, rather than a student’s “good faith effort” to do well in a course
regardless of cumulative GPA.122
After considering student performance data to determine that a student has
failed to make Satisfactory Academic Progress, an appeal can be made by the
119

20 U.S.C. § 1091(c)(3).
Univ. of Va. L. Sch., Satisfactory Academic Progress (SAP), https://content.law.virginia.edu/
financialaid/satisfactory-academic-progress-sap (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
121
Id.
122
Trinity Washington University, Probationary Advising, http://www.trinitydc.edu/cas-advising/files/
2011/09/Early_Alert__Probationary_Advising.pptx.
120
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student by providing a detailed explanation of the undue hardship they are facing
that has affected their ability to meet Satisfactory Academic Progress standards.
Section 1091(c)(3) lays out circumstances that constitute an undue hardship.123
The appeals are then reviewed by a committee within the institution to determine
whether the student’s situation fits the statutorily recognized circumstances
qualifying as an undue hardship. While there is no case law evaluating these
committee appeal decisions interpreting “undue hardship,” an evaluation of
various university satisfactory academic progress policies make clear that the
relevant inquiry involves evaluating the student’s explanation and
documentation of the circumstances surrounding their inability to maintain
satisfactory progress and determining whether the circumstance fits in the
statutory bases of hardship established by Congress. Many universities have
tacked on an additional requirement to the appeal process requiring students to
explain corrective measures they have or will take to achieve and maintain
satisfactory academic progress or an explanation of what has changed in the
situation that will allow the student to make satisfactory process going
forward.124 This additional requirement essentially equates to a good faith
statement by the student that she will take steps to achieve satisfactory progress
if given a second chance to receive financial aid, but it is important to note that
this requirement of pledging future good faith effort does not exist in the statute
and is viewed as a distinct inquiry from determining whether an event has
occurred in a student’s life that meets one of the statutory bases of undue
hardship.125 Accordingly, the undue hardship defense in this provision, as
defined by Congress, only refers to an evaluation of the immediate extenuating
circumstances resulting in the student’s undue hardship to determine whether
the student should be able to maintain their financial aid award.
E. Defense and Extension of Time for Paying Taxes
While one may think it would be particularly useful to evaluate how the
undue hardship standard is used in the Internal Revenue Code given the
123

20 U.S.C. § 1091(c)(3).
See Emory Univ., Satisfactory Academic Progress, http://studentaid.emory.edu/eligibility/sap/.index.
html; Wayne State Univ., Satisfactory Academic Progress, https://wayne.edu/financial-aid/receiving/sap/; Univ.
of Va. L. Sch., Satisfactory Academic Progress, https://content.law.virginia.edu/financialaid/satisfactoryacademic-progress-sap.
125
See Univ. of Va. L. Sch., Satisfactory Academic Progress (SAP), https://content.law.virginia.edu/
financialaid/satisfactory-academic-progress-sap (last visited Feb. 28, 2018); Alabama A&M Univ., Satisfactory
Academic Progress and Appeal Policy, http://www.aamu.edu/Admissions/fincialaid/importantinformation/
Pages/Satisfactory-Academic-Progress-Policy.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2018); Harv. Univ. Sch. of Public
Health, Satisfactory Academic Progress Policy, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/osfs/sap/ (last visited Feb. 28,
2018).
124
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companionship between it and the Bankruptcy Code,126 my analysis finds that
the application of undue hardship in this context is subject to some of the same
inconsistent interpretations and determinations as experienced in the Bankruptcy
Code. The undue hardship standard is used in the Internal Revenue Code as a
defense for failing to pay taxes on time. If a taxpayer can show that paying his
or her taxes on time would have caused an undue hardship, he or she may be
eligible for an extension of time to pay taxes. Specifically, 26 U.S.C.
§ 6161(b)(1) governs provisions allowing an extension of time for paying taxes
and provides that “an extension under this paragraph may be granted only where
it is shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary that payment of a deficiency upon
the date fixed for the payment thereof will result in undue hardship to the
taxpayer” in the case of certain taxes.127
26 C.F.R. 301.6651-1 governs the “additions to tax” penalties for
underpayment of taxes and sets forth the “reasonable cause” requirements a
taxpayer must meet to be able to avoid such penalty assessments for unpaid
taxes. The relevant regulation provides that:
a failure to pay will be considered to be due to reasonable cause to the
extent that the taxpayer has made a satisfactory showing that he
exercised ordinary business care and prudence in providing for
payment of his tax liability and was nevertheless either unable to pay
the tax or would suffer an undue hardship if he paid on the due date.128

To determine whether the taxpayer was unable to pay the tax in spite of the
“exercise of ordinary business care and prudence in providing for payment of
his tax liability,” consideration is given to the facts and circumstances of the
taxpayer’s financial situation, including the amount and nature of the taxpayer’s
expenditures in light of the income he could, at the time of such expenditures,
reasonably expect to receive prior to the date prescribed for the payment of the
tax.129
These provisions serve as the basis of the Internal Revenue Service’s Fresh
Start initiative, which uses the undue hardship standard to determine the
eligibility of individuals who may participate in the initiative to request an
extension of time to pay their IRS tax payments and have their late payment

126
For example, the definition of a qualified student loan for purposes of describing a non-dischargeable
student loan in the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B)) expressly cross-references the Internal Revenue
Code’s definition of a qualified student loan (26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1)).
127
26 U.S.C. § 6161(b)(1).
128
26 C.F.R. 301.6651-1.
129
Id.
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penalties waived, all with the goal of helping relieve individuals of their IRS
debt.130 The option of receiving an extension of time and having late payment
penalties waived is reserved only for taxpayers who would experience “undue
hardship” if forced to pay their taxes by the due date.131 The U.S. Code further
clarifies the undue hardship standard as used in tax context by defining undue
hardship “as more than an inconvenience to the taxpayer” and specifying that it
must appear that a “substantial financial loss” will result to the taxpayer from
making payment on the due date.132 An example of an undue hardship as
provided in federal regulations includes selling property at a loss to pay taxes on
the due date.133 To participate in the IRS’s fresh start initiative or general
application for an extension of time for repayment of taxes due to an undue
hardship, a debtor must prove that she will suffer a significant financial loss if
she pays her tax on the due date.134 This is accomplished by providing the IRS
with a detailed explanation through the IRS’s Application for Extension of Time
for Payment of Tax Due to Undue Hardship form.135
To demonstrate an undue hardship that warrants an extension in time to pay
taxes, it is necessary for a taxpayer to provide the IRS with certain factual
information that allows the IRS to make a determination on whether an undue
hardship exists and whether an extension of time to pay is warranted.136 Without
public access to IRS approvals or denials for an extension of time to pay taxes,
it is impossible to know what factors the government finds significant in
showing substantial financial loss that constitutes an undue hardship. In the
event that IRS decisions are reviewed by the federal judiciary, the facts and
circumstances that courts want to see that constitute an undue hardship to justify
a time extension widely vary, similar to bankruptcy proceedings where courts

130
USTaxCenter, IRS Options If You Cannot Pay Your Taxes, https://www.irs.com/articles/irs-optionsif-you-cannot-pay-your-taxes.
131
Id.
132
26 U.S.C. § 6161(b)(1); see also Application for Extension of Time for Payment of Tax Due to Undue
Hardship, I. R. S. Pub. No. 1127 (Dec. 2011), https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1127 (defining undue
hardship as a term that “means more than an inconvenience. You must show you will have a substantial financial
loss (such as selling property at a sacrifice price) if you pay your tax on the date it is due.”).
133
26 C.F.R. 1.6161-1 (“It must appear that substantial financial loss, for example, loss due to the sale of
property at a sacrifice price, will result to the taxpayer for making payment on the due date of the amount with
respect to which the extension is desired. If a market exists, the sale of property at the current market price is
not ordinarily considered as resulting in an undue hardship.”).
134
Application for Extension of Time for Payment of Tax Due to Undue Hardship, I. R. S. Pub. No. 1127,
(Dec. 2011), https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1127 (last updated Jan. 29, 2019).
135
Id.
136
Baccei v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50687, at *21–22 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2008) (finding
that plaintiff’s request failed to provide an adequate statement of all the “facts and circumstances” explaining
why a denial of the extension would result in hardship to the estate).
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are determining whether an undue hardship exists for purposes of discharging
education debt through bankruptcy.
For example, the type of information the court in Baccei v. United States
recommended be in the extension request form for extension of time to pay
estate taxes included the total amount of liquid assets that the plaintiff claimed
would be available to pay the tax once the bank had approved the release of
funds, whether any assets were available to pay some portion of the tax at the
time it was due, when the plaintiff anticipated that sufficient assets would
become available, and whether plaintiff had explored other means of obtaining
the funds, such as selling the real property prior to the payment due date.137 The
district court that prescribed these recommendations did not go on to explain
how these factors are evaluated and whether certain factors carry more or less
weight than others. Despite these highly individualized factors, it is worth noting
that the taxpayer’s current financial circumstances are the primary inquiry and
really any fact or circumstance can suffice if it shows that being forced to pay a
tax on the due date would sustain a substantial financial loss.
When it comes to evaluating undue hardship for purposes of determining
whether reasonable cause was exercised to justify the waiver of additions to tax
for unpaid taxes, judicial review has shed more light on what constitutes an
undue hardship and how a showing of undue hardship fits in the larger
“reasonable cause” requirement.138 A leading case on this topic comes from the
Ninth Circuit in Synergy Staffing v. United States, in which the court held that
“evidence of financial trouble, without more, is not enough” to establish undue
hardship and that a taxpayer seeking refund of penalties must “come forward
with evidence of what funds it did have on hand when taxes were due,” and
“produce evidence of how it spent those funds in lieu of paying its taxes.”139
Some district courts have interpreted this holding to mean that waivers of
additions to tax for unpaid taxes rests on “the reasonableness of the taxpayer’s
decision not to pay at the time the tax was due, or, in other words, whether the
taxpayer provided sufficient evidence to establish that its decision not to pay the
tax because of financial difficulties was reasonable.”140

137

Id. at *22–23.
Courts are, however, still split in how they evaluate a reasonable cause that excuses penalties for
nonpayment of taxes. See St. Paul Cathedral Sch. v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98526, at *17–19 n.6
(E.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2008).
139
Babcock Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62741, at *22 (D.S.C. May 2, 2013) (citing
Synergy Staffing, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003)).
140
St. Paul Cathedral Sch., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98526, at *18.
138
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To constitute an undue hardship, the facts and circumstances a taxpayer
provides usually need to show that financial ruin is on the horizon. In In re
Arthur’s Industrial Maintenance, the court found that the taxpayer carried its
burden of establishing reasonable cause based on undue hardship when it
decided to complete several large construction jobs instead of pay its obligations
to the IRS because, if it had paid all withholding taxes when due, it would have
been forced to shut down because it could not have afforded to pay for the labor
and purchase the materials necessary to complete the jobs.141 The court’s
analysis began with an inquiry into whether the debtor established reasonable
cause for failing to timely pay and deposit his tax obligations.142 This inquiry
involves a fact intensive evaluation of the individual’s reason for not paying his
taxes. The court agreed with earlier precedent that a showing of undue hardship
supports a finding of reasonable cause for not paying and that a taxpayer’s
financial difficulties may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute reasonable
cause for purposes of the regulation.143 As such, the court held that the debtor in
this case clearly faced a hardship that was more than an inconvenience and that
he established sufficient good faith to rebut any possible inference of willful
neglect.144 Accordingly, the debtor carried its burden of establishing reasonable
cause.145
In another example, In re Pool & Varga, the court considered all facts and
circumstances of the taxpayer’s financial situation, including the amount and
nature of the taxpayer’s expenditures in light of the income he could, at the time
of such expenditures, reasonably expect to receive prior to the date prescribed
for the payment of the tax in order to determine whether the taxpayer was unable
to pay the tax in spite of the exercise of ordinary business care and prudence in
providing for payment of his tax liability.146 According to the court, a taxpayer
is considered to have exercised “ordinary business care and prudence” if she
made reasonable efforts to conserve sufficient assets in marketable form to
satisfy his tax liability and nevertheless was unable to pay all or a portion of the
tax when it became due.147 Here, the debtor met his burden of establishing that
he had reasonable cause for not complying with the statute requiring payment of
taxes, and therefore the court held that the penalty was improperly assessed. The
court’s rationale touched on the fact that the debtor’s financial situation was such
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

In re Arthur’s Indus. Maint., 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2339, at *18–20 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 1992).
Id. at *19–22.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *22.
Id.
In re Pool & Varga, Inc., 60 B.R. 722, 724–25 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
Id.
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that his business would have been irreparably injured or terminated had it paid
the taxes in full on the due date.148 A notable feature from this discussion of the
undue hardship as a defense for failure to pay taxes is that the standard is subject
to some of the same inconsistent interpretations and determinations as currently
experienced in the Bankruptcy Code based on the highly discretionary nature of
the decision-making process set forth by the IRS. Moreover, the private and factintensive procedures the IRS uses to evaluate tax extensions and penalty waiver
requests make it difficult to fully discern the relevant factors the agency uses to
determine whether an undue hardship showing exists. Despite this, the
taxpayer’s current financial circumstances are the key focus and any factor the
IRS evaluates is intended to discern whether the individual would have sustained
a substantial financial loss had they been forced to pay their taxes on the due
date. In other words, the IRS is concerned with the future livelihood of the
taxpayer if she is forced to pay taxes based on current circumstances.
F. Supplemental Security Income Defense
There is one place in federal law, besides the reaffirmation agreement
provision in the Bankruptcy Code, where undue hardship is defined by a brightline test, and that test exists in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program
and provides a defense for an individual that transferred resources for less than
fair market value while they were being considered for eligibility and such a
denial of eligibility causes them an undue hardship. Specifically, 42 U.S.C.
1382(b) provides that if an individual disposes of resources for less than fair
market value before, on or after applying for benefits, the individual is ineligible
for benefits for a certain amount of time unless that “the denial of eligibility
would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of criteria established
by the Commissioner.”149 The regulation implementing the regulation states that
an undue hardship exists when “[a]n individual alleges that failure to receive SSI
benefits would deprive the individual of food or shelter; and the applicable
Federal benefit rate (plus the federally-administered State supplementary
payment level) exceeds the sum of: The individual’s monthly countable and
excludable income and monthly countable and excludable liquid resources.”150
By the time an SSI applicant’s undue hardship state is evaluated, the conduct
that has essentially put the individual at risk for becoming ineligible for benefits
has already been considered and is therefore not a part of the undue hardship

148
149
150

In re Pool & Varga, Inc., 60 B.R. at 728.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1382b(c)(1)(A)(i); 1382b(c)(C)(iv).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1246.
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inquiry. Instead, undue hardship is defined by a bright-line test regarding the
individual’s current financial condition and the impact that denying benefits will
have. Undue hardship in this context is met through a two-part test. First, to show
that an individual can’t pay for shelter, he or she needs to show that he or she
cannot afford any without an SSI check and that there is no other affordable
housing available.151 Second, the individual must also show that his or her total
available funds (income and liquid resources) is less than the monthly SSI
amount for their respective state.152 This bright-line test provides clear support
for the proposition that an undue hardship inquiry does not contemplate whether
the cause of the hardship warrants the individual privy to supplemental security
income or whether the individual’s good faith (or bad faith) warrants their access
to the income. Instead, the undue hardship inquiry is ascertaining the effect that
withholding the supplemental security income would have on the individual. In
the event that Congress or courts would adopt a bright-line test to evaluate the
discharge of student loans in bankruptcy, this standard warrants close
consideration in how it aligns with my proposition that courts should focus on
determining the effect that declaring the debt nondischargeable would have on
the debtor and using that determination as a basis for whether bankruptcy relief
is justified.
G. Discovery in Litigation
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are a set of judicial procedures
approved by Congress that govern civil proceedings in federal court. The undue
hardship standard is used in the context of discovery, where each party can
obtain information or evidence from the other party, and provides a defense to
the discovery of certain information under the work product doctrine.153 Under
Rule 26, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its
representative.154 However, materials prepared in anticipation of litigation can
be discovered if the party requesting the materials shows it has a “substantial
need for the materials” and “cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their
substantial equivalent by other means.”155
151
Social Security Administration, SI 01150.126 Exceptions—Undue Hardship, https://secure.ssa.gov/
poms.nsf/lnx/0501150126.
152
Id.
153
FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
154
FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
155
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(ii), 18 C.F.R. § 385.402(b); but see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B), 18 C.F.R.
§ 385.402(b) (“In ordering any such discovery, the presiding officer will prevent disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney.”).
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When a court evaluates a request for discovery, it first has to certify that the
requested document or tangible thing is ordinary work product. Then, the party
seeking discovery under rule 26(b)(3) must show that he or she has “substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means.”156 In seeking to establish undue hardship in this context, parties have to
be prepared to show they have made an effort to obtain the sought after material
and that all avenue of obtaining the material have been exhausted. For example,
in Davis v. Emery Air Freight Corporation, an employee sought documents
belonging to her employer regarding an internal investigation.157 The employer
argued, however, that information sought by the plaintiff is available through
depositions of the defendant’s employees.158 The court, pointing out that the
record showed that the employee had only taken one deposition, held that the
employee failed to demonstrate an undue hardship due to her inability to obtain
the substantial equivalent of this evidence.159 Courts also require a high level of
specificity, without speculation, when it comes to making claims for undue
hardship. Additionally, as a general rule, inconvenience and expense do not
constitute undue hardship.160 Other factors that courts use in determining
substantial need and undue hardship include the importance of the materials to
the preparation of the case, the difficulty in obtaining substantial equivalents to
the desired materials, the use of the materials, the availability of alternative
means of obtaining the desired information if discovery is denied, and the extent
to which the asserted need is substantiated.161
Rule 26 in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represents one area in federal
law in which conduct and a good faith effort appear to play an important role in
the undue hardship analysis. It is important to note that the presumption of
consistent usage yields to context, and there is good reason to believe that a
party’s conduct is very relevant in matters concerning discovery of materials
used for litigation purposes and that an evaluation of individual conduct and a
party’s “good faith” efforts are warranted in an analysis of whether a party is
truly experiencing undue hardship to warrant discovery. The work product
doctrine is known as an important tool for sheltering the mental processes of an
156

Jeff Anderson, et. al., Special Project: The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 798

(1983).
157

Davis v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 212 F.R.D. 432 (2003).
Id. at 436.
159
Id. at 437.
160
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, Civil Practice and Litigation Techniques in Federal and
State Courts, Course Number: SL081.
161
Id.
158
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attorney by providing a privileged area within which he or she can analyze and
prepare his client’s case.162 It is essential to the legal profession that various
duties are completed with a certain degree of privacy that is free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.163 Another purpose
of the work product doctrine “is to establish a zone of privacy for strategic
litigation planning and to prevent one party from piggybacking on the
adversary’s preparation.”164 Accordingly, a logical argument can be made that
that this varying use of undue hardship exists when such important issues are at
risk when it comes to disclosure of work product in the legal profession.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Considering the substantial relief the bankruptcy system can provide to
individuals with burdensome educational debt, and the problems with the current
interpretation of the undue hardship which determines whether educational debt
is dischargeable through bankruptcy, a reconceptualization of how the “undue
hardship” standard is interpreted in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) is necessary. An
important point that this reconceptualization must address is the ambiguity or
vagueness that Congress left in the Bankruptcy Code when employing the
“undue hardship” standard in the student loan context.
One of the most viable ways to construe “undue hardship” in the bankruptcy
context is to approach the phrase with an appreciation of continuity in the law
under the principles and canons discussed in this paper. Through this approach
of analyzing the different uses of undue hardship as used throughout federal
statutes, it is evident that the undue hardships standard concerns an individual’s
current circumstances, financial or otherwise, and any factors used to determine
whether an undue hardship exists should focus on ascertaining facts that help
inform a decision-maker about the individual’s present situation. Since the
assertion of an undue hardship is generally used as a defense or an exception,
the undue hardship analysis should take into account the fate of an individual if
he or she is denied relief through the undue hardship exception or defense.
Any definition Congress or the executive branch provides to “undue
hardship” in § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code should include factors that
evaluate the future livelihood of the debtor if she is denied bankruptcy relief
162
Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, When Does Monitoring Defendants and Their Lawyers Cross
the Line, 31 CRIM. JUST. 46, 47.
163
United States v. DeLeon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35177, *188 (D.N.M. Mar. 8, 2017).
164
United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995) (purpose of doctrine is to establish ‘‘zone
of privacy’’).
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based on the debtor’s current financial circumstances. Such a definition would
not require an inquiry into a debtor’s good faith efforts to repay the loan based
on prebankruptcy conduct because Congress has shown that it knows how to
expressly require good faith in a distinct and separate manner from undue
hardship. The fact that Congress has used the clause “acted in good faith” in
conjunction with “undue hardship” in the reaffirmation agreement context in the
Bankruptcy Code provides strong support for the proposition that when
Congress drafts a statute with the undue hardship standard, undue hardship alone
does not include an inquiry into a debtor’s good faith.165 This proposition is only
strengthened by the reasonable accommodation analysis used in conjunction
with the undue hardship inquiry in the employment discrimination context,
where a distinction was made between the two inquiries by the Supreme
Court.166
An undue hardship definition should also emphasize the need for courts to
focus on the debtor’s current financial situation without undue regard to prebankruptcy conduct or assurance of persisting financial distress. When courts
assess an employer’s claim of undue hardship as a defense for making
accommodations for an employee, they assess factors that relate to the nature
and financial resources of an employer at the time the employee makes the
accommodation request.167 Likewise, when a university is assessing a student’s
eligibility for federal financial aid when the student has failed to make
satisfactory academic progress, they are evaluating facts to support a finding of
undue hardship related to an extenuating circumstance that has caused the
student to fail to make satisfactory in a given semester.168 When a taxpayer fails
to pay their taxes on the due date, the IRS makes a primary inquiry into what
resources and assets the taxpayer had available on the date the taxes were due to
determine whether an undue hardship would have occurred had the taxes been
paid.169 The bright-line test for undue hardship in the context of Supplemental
Security Income includes factors that ascertain an individual’s total available
funds for the month that undue hardship is alleged.170 For the bankruptcy
context, these definitions and applications of undue hardship underscore the
importance of drafting a definition that includes factors that objectively discern

165

11 U.S.C. § 524.
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002).
167
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
168
20 U.S.C. § 1091(c)(3).
169
26 C.F.R. 301.6651-1.
170
Social Security Administration, Program Operations Manuel System, SI 01150.126 Exceptions—
Undue Hardship, https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501150126.
166
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debtor’s current financial situation at the time of filing for bankruptcy to
determine whether an undue hardship exists.
After discerning a debtor’s current financial situation, courts have to
ascertain whether the financial circumstances warrant discharge of student
loans. To do this, any definition proposed by Congress should include factors
that evaluate the future livelihood of the debtor. The thresholds for what
ultimately constitute an undue hardship vary among the different applications of
the standard. Nevertheless, the application of the undue hardship standard in any
context includes an inquiry into the livelihood of the individual if she is denied
relief through the undue hardship exception or defense. For example, when
courts assess an employer’s claim of undue hardship as a defense for making
accommodations for an employee, a relevant factor is the impact on the facility’s
ability to conduct business if the court requires the accommodation to be
made.171 When courts are evaluating whether an undue hardship exists for a
business that is late paying taxes, facts that show imminent financial ruin
indicate undue hardship.172 The SSI undue hardship formula also emphasizes the
need for the IRS to be cognizant of the effect not receiving the benefits would
have on the individual based on the formula’s inquiry into whether an individual
would have food or shelter without the benefits.173 Any definition that guides
the undue hardship analysis in the bankruptcy context should also account for
the importance of considering the livelihood of the debtor if the court decides
her educational debt is not dischargeable.
It is important to remember that the presumption of consistent usage yields
to context, and that in the context of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, there is an implied inquiry into a party’s good faith effort when
evaluating whether a party can obtain a substantial equivalent of the requested
trial materials without undue hardship.174 The work-product doctrine has
important implications in the American litigation system, which may warrant a
valid justification for using the undue hardship standard in a different way to fit
the context and purpose of the rule.175 The same justifications do not exist in the
171
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2008); see also Gilbert v. Frank, 949F.2d 637, 643–44 (2nd Cir. 1991)
(affirming the dismissal of the complaint, in part, because making the employee’s requested accommodation
would slow down and reduce the productivity of the operation).
172
See In re Arthur’s Indus. Maint., 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2339, at *18–19 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 1992);
In re Pool & Varga, Inc., 60 B.R. 722, 724–25 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
173
20 C.F.R. § 416.1246.
174
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
175
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (finding that providing materials prepared for trial to
opposing counsel would result in inefficiency and unfairness, which would have a demoralizing effect on the
legal profession and result in the interests of clients and the cause of justice being poorly served).
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Bankruptcy Code context, however. Instead, the bankruptcy system, and the
individuals it serves, would benefit from a reconceptualization of undue
hardship that includes a focus on a debtor’s current circumstances and considers
the livelihood of the debtor if his or her debt is not discharged. Including these
considerations in a definition of undue hardship in the Bankruptcy Code moves
the bankruptcy system in a positive direction by focusing the court’s inquiry into
the circumstances that warrant an undue hardship determination. A definition
that focuses a court’s inquiry into what constitutes an undue hardship is an
important step toward achieving consistent judicial determinations and
mitigating arbitrary judicial subjectivity.
IV. POLICY REASONS FOR RECONCEPTUALIZING UNDUE HARDSHIP
Important policy reasons exist for reconceptualizing undue hardship in a way
that is consistent with how the standard is used in other federal law contexts.
First, since the current undue hardship test gives way to judicial subjectivity and
arbitrary results, encouraging courts to focus on the effect that declaring a debt
nondischargable would have on a debtor, instead of focusing on whether the
cause of hardship warrants the discharge of the debt or good faith efforts or
conduct a debtor did prior to bankruptcy, allows bankruptcy courts to take a
more uniform approach in determining whether to discharge a debtor’s student
loan debt. There is a danger involved in having the meaning of undue hardship
determined by the principles and standards of the judge because “uncertainty
and unequal treatment of debtors” will inevitably occur.176 While it is reasonable
to allow judges to have the discretion to act on a case-by-case basis where
Congress has spoken broadly or generally, such as it has in describing “undue
hardship,” it is problematic when “notwithstanding the guideposts left for judges
to figure out the proper path of undue hardship, many have gotten it wrong.”177
In this way, it is justified to be concerned about the danger of discretion and the
ability it has to “undermine the integrity of the system by producing haphazard
results that have compromised the fresh start principle.”178 Cognitive science
based literature supports the idea that “[i]f judges premise their decision-making
on the notion that there is some objective and universal perspective, they are
ignoring fundamental principles of cognition.”179 As former Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court Benjamin Cardozo once wrote, “we may try to see things as
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objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes
except our own.”180
Proponents of a national definition contend that the undue hardship test
should focus on the debtor’s actual ability to “afford to pay the debt,” which is
exactly what a definition that focuses on a debtor’s current financial
circumstances and on their future livelihood if they are not granted a discharge
does. Moreover, the goal of uniformity in the law requires the consistent
treatment of debtors in this area of bankruptcy. Accordingly, a definition guided
by the considerations outlined in this Comment will help courts treat similarly
situated debtors uniformly. This helps eliminate the current practice of treating
debtors differently depending upon what circuit they reside in or which
bankruptcy judge handles their case. It also avoids forum shopping problems
and helps eliminate any diminishment in the public’s loss of faith in the
bankruptcy laws because of their arbitrary or unpredictable nature.
Second, there are significant economic reasons for allowing debtors with
student loans to experience a fresh start. The costs of higher education and the
associated student loan debt burdens carried by former students are “large drags
on economic growth, social mobility, skills generation, and simply the wellbeing of vast numbers of past, current, and future students.”181 For example,
financial experts note that higher education debt burdens are disqualifying a
generation of young graduates from home ownership.182 Many commentators
argue that “to forgive student loan debt and return consumers debtors to normal
economic life is an economic imperative.”183 Traditional bankruptcy theory
supports the proposition that “society as a whole benefits by relieving the most
hopeless debtors from their debt obligations.”184 By experiencing relief from
debt obligations, “debtors are provided a ‘fresh start’ so they may resume their
lives as responsible consumers and producers.”185 Accordingly, “discharge of
debts in bankruptcy serves an important traditional function in the American
economic order” and is considered “one of the few traditional safety nets amid
an otherwise free market economy.”186
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There are also significant social reasons for reevaluating the undue hardship
standard. There are several types of financial obligations that are excepted from
discharge in bankruptcy, in which many, if not all, arise from moral culpability
of the debtor. By making education debt non-dischargeable, Congress has
equated student loan default with offenses like fraud, willful injury, and failure
to pay child support. 187 Moreover, “[i]f a borrower incurred a student loan debt
intending to not repay it, the debt would properly be non-dischargeable as a debt
incurred by fraud.”188
Last, the existing tests for undue hardship under § 523(a)(8) were developed
in the context of an automatic discharge for seven-year-old student loans that
could not be repaid.189 Now that undue hardship is the only way for debtors to
seek discharge of student loans, there is scholarly consensus that courts should
reassess and lower that standard. Defining undue hardship with an emphasis on
the debtor’s current circumstances and considers the future livelihood of a debtor
if he or she is denied discharge through bankruptcy is one way to update the
standard by providing a realistic chance of proving undue hardship with a
standard that reflects the current construction of the Bankruptcy Code and
continuity in the law regarding undue hardship.
CONCLUSION
Access to higher education is largely shaped by federal law, and any actions
and reforms that restrict access to higher education opportunity, or the benefits
to be derived from obtaining a degree, deserve analysis and critique. This
Comment is sensitive to the fact that bankruptcy should not be viewed as a
means to finance higher education but takes the position that it should be an
option for students burdened by cumbersome student loan amounts that are
prohibiting them from enjoying the benefits of their education and contributing
as productive members of society. Current interpretation and implementation of
the “undue hardship” exception in the dischargeability assessment of
educational debt serves as a substantial and concerning barrier for debtors that
would otherwise meet eligibility requirements for bankruptcy relief.190 By
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evaluating the undue hardships standard in the context of public benefits
employment discrimination, financial aid eligibility, tax payment extensions,
and discovery in civil procedure, this Comment supports the conclusion that the
primary inquiry into a debtor’s current financial circumstances without unduly
regard to prebankruptcy conduct or assurance of persisting financial distress.
The majority of the Circuit Courts’ current application of the undue hardship
standard with a three-prong test including factors of good faith efforts to repay
and a future inability to repay is at conflict with other statutory definitions and
interpretations of “undue hardship” across federal law, which serves as a
substantial barrier to allowing student debtors the opportunity to experience a
“fresh start” free from encumbering and disabling debts that bankruptcy law
seeks to provide.
It is worth acknowledging the rationale behind excepting student loans from
discharge through bankruptcy, and that the exception of student loans from
discharge is prefaced on un-evidenced allegations of abuse and assumptions that
student borrowers have bad intentions. Legislative history shows that the
Bankruptcy Act Commission, established by Congress in 1970 to analyze and
evaluate the then system of bankruptcy law, suggested an educational debt
exception to discharge “in order to reinstate public confidence in the bankruptcy
system.”191 Evidence was presented to the Commission that showed that less
than one percent of federally insured student loans were discharged in
bankruptcy, however the Commission still found it necessary to preempt
“potential abuses.”192 After a series of amendments, educational debt was given
a conditionally dischargeable status except if a showing of “undue hardship”
exists.
The courts across the country must adopt a unified standard that reflects
three things: (1) Congress’s intent in inserting the “undue hardship” standard in
the assessment of discharging educational debt, (2) the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code, and (3) the need for consistency and fairness in the court
system. Research on human cognition proves that judges bring various
influences, such as age, gender, generation, religion, and values with them to the
decision-making process when considering this like what constitutes an undue
hardship.193 While there are many ways uniformity and consistency in the
standard can be achieved, this Comment takes the position that tools of statutory
interpretation provide an avenue for reconceptualizing “undue hardship” in light
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of the use in the current majority test. By reconceptualizing the standard in a
way that is consistent with the use of the standard throughout other sources of
federal law, my hope is that bankruptcy courts will employ a standard that
recognizes the value in obtaining higher education and delivers an equal
opportunity for a “fresh start” from burdensome debt obligations to those who
pursue higher education.
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